Saturday, June 30th, 2007
|
|
|
|
|
|
The rating of mutual funds has been growing considerably not only in the United States but also in Europe. It provides an answer to a legitimate expectation on the part of investors and their consultants, who are concerned about comparing the performances and value-added of management offerings that are both increasing in number and becoming increasingly easy to switch in and out of, as a result of the arrival of “open” distribution architecture.
A corollary of the success of ratings and their growing influence on the collection of capital is that users are increasingly demanding with regard to the relevance and methodological rigor of the performance evaluation system implemented.
In point of fact, the classifications of the main rating services on the market no longer meet the principles of reliability demanded by both investors and management companies.
These demands are the following:
The EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is put together from three criteria:
For each of these dimensions of the rating, the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating relies on state-of-the-art conceptual and technical tools.
The risk-adjusted performance is measured in a two-step process.
The first step aims to select the style indices that represent the strategic allocation and therefore the risks taken over the rating period. This analysis is carried out in the form of a constrained multi-linear regression such as developed by William Sharpe.
Using this fund-specific style index selection and the related weights (customised benchmark), it is possible to calculate the fund’s excess performance while taking the risks to which it was really exposed into account. In order to do this, we use a multifactor index model which constitutes a robust and practical application of modern portfolio theory (Arbitrage Pricing Theory).
In order to limit the risks of collinearity between the indices, the fund universe was divided into 58 distinct categories using the EuroPerformance classification groupings.
| Style Analysis Category | ||||
| Equities Austria | Equities Americas | Equities Asia | ||
| Equities Belgium | Equities Canada | Equities Asia ex Japan | ||
| Equities Denmark | Equities Latin America | Equities Australia | ||
| Equities Emerging Europe | Equities North America | Equities China | ||
| Equities Euro | Equities Hong-Kong | |||
| Equities Europe | Equities Emerging Countries | Equities India | ||
| Equities Europe ex UK | Equities International | Equities Japan | ||
| Equities Finland | Equities Israel | Equities Korea | ||
| Equities France | Equities Morocco | Equities Malaysia | ||
| Equities Germany | Equities South Africa | Equities Singapore | ||
| Equities Irland | Equities Taiwan | |||
| Equities Italy | Equities Thailand | |||
| Equities Netherlands | Bonds British Pound | |||
| Equities Norway | Bonds Euro | Sectors Euro Zone | ||
| Equities Portugal | Bonds Europe | Sectors Europe | ||
| Equities Russia | Bonds Europe High Yield | Sectors World | ||
| Equities Scandinavia | Bonds High yield Euro | |||
| Equities Spain | Bonds International | Balanced Euro zone | ||
| Equities Sweden | Bonds International Hedged | Balanced Europe | ||
| Equities Switzerland | Bonds International High Yield | Balanced International | ||
| Equities Turkey | Bonds Swiss Franc | |||
| Equities United Kindom | ||||
The concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) allows all the portfolio risks, which are spread between several asset classes, to be summed up in a single value. While a measure such as the variance characterises the average risk of the portfolio (mean dispersion in the return distribution), the Value-at-Risk refers to a value for the possible loss; in this sense, it is a measure of extreme risk.
The principle behind the VaR concept is therefore simple, but its practical implementation is more complex. The asset returns are assumed to be subject to common risk factors, which enables the portfolio’s return to be decomposed. By modelling the future evolution of these factors, it is possible to estimate the value of the portfolio at a fixed horizon and to deduce its VaR from there.
By estimating a Cornish Fisher-type semi-parametric VAR, the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating allow for the integration of the potential (to a 99% threshold) extreme loss for funds that present non-Gaussian return profiles, i.e. funds that do not respect a “normal distribution”, either because they invest in markets where the extreme losses are considerable, or because they use derivative instruments.
The performance persistence measure implemented by the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating relies on two indicators:
The funds that are eligible for the Style Rating have the following elements:
The funds belonging to the following categories are excluded:
Finally, the Convertible Bonds category is not analysed because there is no style index for this category.
The scores attributed by the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating are independent from any category and, as such, are perfectly comparable, whatever the type of fund rated.
Nonetheless, in order to simplify the presentation of the ratings, six categories have been defined to make them easier to read and to understand.
| Presentation Category |
| European Equities |
| American Equities |
| International Equities |
| Euro Zone Bonds |
| International Bonds |
| Euro Diversified |
| International Diversified |
Rating Attribution Table
| Rating | Diminishing Alpha | Average Alpha | Gain Frequency | Hurst Exponent |
| >= 0 | >= .5 | >= .5 | ||
| >= 0 | >= .5 | |||
| >= 0 | < .5 | |||
| >= - Average Mgt fees | ||||
| 50% + | < - Average Mgt fees | |||
| 50% - | < - Average Mgt fees | |||
| VaR too high (V) | Funds whose Value at Risk is greater than the average of the VaR in the analysis category + 2 standard deviations are identified and do not receive any star. | |||
| R2 too low (R2 ) | In order to be graded, the coefficent of determination resulting from the style analysis must be higher than 70% exept for diversified funds and funds belonging to international categories whose level is fixed to 60%. | |||
The EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is updated every month. The behaviours identified by the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating are stable and do not require the implementation of rating management rules that limit its variability.
The Style Rating is a measure of the quality of active management. The Style Rating criteria are demanding and fewer than 10% of the funds rated obtain the maximal rating of .
The and
categories contain funds that do not outperform their objective on average. These funds were able to deliver positive performances over the period analysed while not exceeding the average performance produced by the indices that are representative of their strategy.
The category contains funds whose performance is very similar to that of the markets in which they are invested. Their outperformance nonetheless allows them to cover the average management fees in their category.
The and
categories contain funds that outperform over the analysis period. This excess performance is the fruit of the manager’s decisions: active stock picking and/or market or style timing.
Among these funds that excel, some provide a significant gain frequency that characterises persistence of outperformance. These funds are distinguished by the maximal rating of .
Finally, the (Hurst exponent) category distinguishes funds that regularly outperform their benchmark. The ‘H’ is a decision support tool because it indicates that the investor has a better than average chance, at the subscription stage, of benefiting from good performance of the fund chosen.
The right to use the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is provided free of charge on condition that the source of the rating reproduced is cited. Details on the conditions and limitations of the use of the Style Rating are given on our website.
The Style Rating results are published on the 4th Friday of the month on this website: http://stylerating.com. The site provides details on the evolution of the rated funds and lists the funds excluded from the style rating. The technical documentation is also available on the website.
The EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is an association between Europerformance and the Edhec Risk and Asset Management Research Centre.
The Edhec Risk and Asset Management Research Centre was set up in 2001. Its team of 28 research engineers, specialised associate researchers and professors work together on applied research programmes in the areas of asset allocation and performance measurement in the traditional and alternative universes.
Edhec is the scientific adviser to the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating.
The Alpha League Table score: alpha intensity
The objective of the Alpha League Table is to allow asset management firms to be ranked according to their capacity to generate alpha frequently: alpha intensity.
Alpha intensity is the product of two indicators calculated using information from the EuroPerformance-EDHEC Style Rating:
The Alpha League Table alpha intensity score is the product of the alpha frequency and average alpha figures.
If company X has an alpha frequency of 30%, i.e. 3 funds out of 10 have received a score of 4 or 5 stars, and an average alpha (>0) score of 4%, then its final rating will be: 4% x 0.30 = 1.2%.
Similarly, if the company has a frequency figure of 50% and average alpha of 3%, its final score will be 3% x 0.50 = 1.5%.
Asset Allocation
| The Four-Moment capital asset pricing model: some basic results Authors: Jurcenzko and Maillet Date: 2002 |
The authors show that the Two-moments CAPM can be extended to a Four-Moment CAPM where not only mean and variance are considered, but skewness and kurtosis. They derive a unified theory in a Four-Moment Capital Asset Pricing Model framework where variance, skewness and kurtosis receive a risk premium.
The Two-moments CAPM is linked to return normality and to a quadratic utility function. This model is not empirically verified by finance studies. During the last 20 years, models going beyond mean and variance have been developed such as the Lower CAPM , Gini CAPM and VaR CAPM . To take account of the asymmetry effect of the return distribution, Rubinstein (1973) and Krauss, Litzenberger (1976) propose an extension of the classical Two-moments CAPM. The characteristic of their model is based on a systematic skewness premium. Jurcenzko and Maillet extend the work of previous researches with kurtosis and the first four co-moments.
Like beta is related to variance, systematic skewness is related to skewness and sytematic kurtosis is related to kurtosis. The linked between variance, systematic skewness, systematic kurtosis and an asset expected return is the following:
(1)
where


and Rm the market expected return, Sm the market skewness, Km the market kurtosis, α1 and α2 are respectively the premium required for skewness and kurtosis risk aversion. An asset with a negative contribution to portfolio skewness has a negative sytematic skewness, thus the second term in equation (1) will be positive and the E(R) will be positive. An asset with a positive contribution to portfolio kurtosis has a positive systematic kurtosis, thus the third term in equation (1) will be positive. Adding these two terms with the beta market premium gives the total asset expected return in a Four-Moment CAPM space. An asset with extreme risks (i.e. during equity/bond/currency market shocks , the asset negative returns is extemely lower with respect to thenormal case) should receive an additonal premium coming from equation (1) second and third terms.
The Four-Moment CAPM has not been empirically tested except by Hwang and Satchell (1999). Further research needs to be done to test this model on assets with high devations from normality such emerging market and hedge fund indices.
Footnotes
{1} Nantel, , Price, Price (1982)
{2} Okunev (1990)
{3} Alexander, Baptista (2000)
{4} For example a short put option or a merger arbitrage hedge fund index.
{5} For example, an emerging market index or a low liquid asset.
References
Nantel T., Price B., Price K., Variance and lower partial moments measures of sytematic risk: some analytical and empirical results, Journal of Finance, 37, p.843-855, (1982)
Okunev J., An alternative measure of mutual fund performance, Journal of business finance and accounting, 17, p.247-264, (1990)
Alexander C., Baptista A., Economic implications of using a mean-VaR model for portfolio selection: a comparison with mean-variance selection, working paper, (2000)
Hwang S., Satchell S., Modelling emerging markets risk premia using higher moments, International journal of finance and economics, 4, p.271-296, (1999)
http://www.edhec-risk.com/site_edhecrisk/public/research_news/
choice/RISKReview1063697659662713107
|
|||||||||||||||
| Securitization Accounting | |||||||||
| The Ins and Outs (And Some Do’s and Don’ts) of FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39 and More … | |||||||||
|
The seventh edition of this booklet deals with securitizations, mainly those employing term structures and traditional asset types. We provide reference material for all the relevant, but separate, guidance issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) assembled in one place. Read our “Securitization Accounting” report in the attached PDF file below. |
|||||||||
|
|||||||||
| Securitization Accounting (3493 KB) | |||||||||
The Ins and Outs (And Some Do’s and Don’ts) of FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39 and More…
|
Subprime: Point to Where It Hurts
Steps to Modify Loans
And Avert Foreclosures
Has Investors Clashing
By LINGLING WEI, RUTH SIMON and JAMES R. HAGERTY
June 29, 2007; Page C1
As defaults on home loans mount, mortgage companies are scrambling to work out deals to help as many borrowers as possible stay in their houses.
On the surface, it seems an obvious tactic. Lenders usually end up losing money on foreclosed homes because of legal and other costs and the need to sell those properties fast, often at a knockdown price. Also, politicians are pressing mortgage companies to minimize the damages foreclosures cause to families and neighborhoods.
Still, the effort to hold down foreclosures threatens to create clashes between mortgage companies and investors in securities backed by bundles of home loans, a $6 trillion market that has been shaken recently by losses on some of the riskier types of mortgage bonds. And because of the way these securities are sold, these efforts can pit groups of holders against each other.
“It’s going to create a class warfare” among different types of investors, predicts Kyle Bass, managing partner of Hayman Capital Partners LP, a Dallas hedge fund.
![[Chart]](http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/images/MI-AM127_LOANMO_20070629002837.gif)
Foreclosures are rising fast partly because lenders in recent years rushed to make no-money-down loans to people with weak credit records and didn’t always verify their income. At the same time, the decline in housing prices in much of the country makes it hard for borrowers who fall behind to sell their homes for enough money to pay off the loan.
When borrowers can’t keep up, lenders typically consider whether it makes sense to offer a loan modification. Such workout deals, known as “mods,” often involve lowering the interest rate or stretching out the term. Lenders have used mods for years, but the practice is expected to proliferate as defaults rise.
Sharon Greenberg, an analyst for Credit Suisse Group in New York, estimates that before this year modified loans typically accounted for less than 2% of all those outstanding. Within the next couple of years, she says, they may peak at several times that level.
Investors holding mortgage-backed bonds are watching nervously because mods may not always be in their best interest. Some investors fear that loan servicers — the firms, often owned by lenders, that collect payments and deal with defaults — will make too many mods. Generally, investors favor mods that ease a normally reliable borrower through a rough patch, but not those that merely buy time for deadbeats.
Investors doubt some homeowners merit a rescue plan. In some cases, says Kishore Yalamanchili, a fund manager with BlackRock Inc., New York, “by making these people current, you are pushing losses to another year or so.”
Credit Suisse analysts recently examined loans that had been modified over the past few years by one nationwide lender and found that borrowers missed at least one monthly payment after a mod in nearly 40% of the cases. (That failure rate may have been skewed upward by victims of Hurricane Katrina who never returned to their homes.)
If the borrower is unlikely to keep up with payments even after a mod, many investors would prefer that servicers pursue a foreclosure quickly, especially in regions where house prices are falling, reducing the value of the collateral.
Servicers are required by their contracts to act in the interests of the investors and modify loans only when that can be expected to reduce losses. That puts servicers in the tricky position of trying to figure out which borrowers are basically sound and when it makes more sense to foreclose quickly.
One complication is that different classes of investors have different interests, reflecting the complicated mechanics of mortgage securities. Issues of mortgage-backed securities are divided into slices with various ratings, depending on the level of risk. Holders of the highest-rated slices (those with the lowest risk) are first in line to collect payments of interest and principal flowing from the loans. Many such bond issues are structured so that there is initially more than enough cash flow available to cover obligations to all the investors, leaving a cushion to cover potential losses from loan defaults. If after three years or so the loans have performed well enough to meet certain performance measures, the cushion may be reduced.
In that case, some of the excess cash available goes to holders of lower-rated securities and “residuals,” the highest-risk parts of the securities that are last in line for payments.
If loan mods delay the onset of foreclosures, holders of the lower-rated securities and residuals are more likely to get those payments. But, holders of AAA and other high-rated securities may argue that the loan mods have artificially boosted the performance of the loans and that the holders of lower-rated securities and residuals are getting payments that should be preserved to protect owners of higher-rated paper against the risk of a resurgence of defaults later.
Even where there are no clashes among investors, servicers face restrictions on how they modify loans.
Moody’s Investors Service, a ratings provider, recently reviewed roughly 400 subprime mortgage-security transactions issued last year: 5% of those deals prohibit any kind of loan mod; among those that allow mods, about a third stipulate that no more than 5% of the loans backing the securities can be modified. Subprime loans are those to people with spotty credit histories.
“Those restrictions may prevent servicers from doing the things they need to do,” says Larry Litton Jr., chief executive of Litton Loan Servicing, a unit of C-BASS LLC, New York. Mr. Litton says his firm hasn’t bumped up against any ceilings. Still, he favors eliminating restrictions in future issues of mortgage securities to give servicers more flexibility.
Write to Lingling Wei at lingling.wei@dowjones.com, Ruth Simon at ruth.simon@wsj.com and James R. Hagerty at bob.hagerty@wsj.com
http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN2834578820070628
June 28 (Reuters) - Collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, are a rapidly growing class of securities created by bundling portions of other bonds into a new, more diversified structure that spreads the risk among investors around the world.
Demand for CDOs in the past few years has fueled demand for other debt such as subprime mortgage asset-backed securities.
While there are many kinds of debt used as collateral, the surge in subprime bonds as a percentage of total ABS has led to their domination in many CDOs. Investors watching the prolonged U.S. housing slump cause rising delinquencies and losses on the ABS expect CDO values and ratings will soon be affected.
Losses at two Bear Stearns Cos. (BSC.N: Quote, Profile, Research) hedge funds after bad bets on subprime came to a head in June as bank creditors tried to extricate their investments in the fund. Most of the funds’ CDO assets put up for sale never found buyers at prices acceptable to the banks, fueling speculation that ABS CDOs would suffer widespread markdowns, sources said.
High-grade CDOs buy the top, “AAA” rated portions, while so-called mezzanine CDOs are comprised of the riskier parts of underlying bonds structured to take the first losses, if any.
U.S. CDO issuance surged in 2006 to $386 billion from about $201 billion in 2005, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. Managers have packaged $182 billion so far in 2007. (CDO volume in Europe last year was $141.2 billion. In Asia, it was $21.9 billion.) PRIMARY TYPES OF CDOs:
STRUCTURED FINANCE CDO: Includes CDOs backed by asset-backed securities supported by residential mortgages (subprime, “Alt-A” and prime), student loans, manufactured housing loans, auto and credit card receivables.
High-grade structured finance CDO issuance increased to $128.5 billion last year from $59 billion in 2005. Volume of mezzanine structured finance CDOs was $55.6 billion in 2006 and $30.7 billion in 2005. (Home-equity loans, consisting mostly of subprime mortgages, are the fastest-growing segment of ABS, rising to 26 percent this year from 14 percent in 2000.)
Issuance of high-grade and mezzanine structured finance CDOs this year is on pace to exceed 2006’s record.
C0RPORATE BOND CDO: A CDO backed by debt issued by a corporation, both junk and investment grade Investment-grade debt CDO issuance rose to $34.9 billion in 2006 from nearly $18 billion in 2005. High-yield bond CDO issuance that pioneered the CDO market in the late 1980s was $1.2 billion last year and $1.6 billion in 2005. Volume is just above $1 billion for both categories this year.
COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS, or CLOs: A type of CDO packaged with slices of high-yield bank loans. Issuance rose to $106 billion in 2006 from $59.7 billion in 2005. More than $53 billion has been sold since January this year.
OTHER TYPES OF CDOs:
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BOND CDO: A CDO backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS. Volume of $28.3 billion last year was more than double that of 2005. Issuance this year has topped $12.6 billion
EMERGING MARKET BOND CDO: A CDO backed by emerging market debt. Sales of $881 million in 2006 compare with $1.6 billion in 2005.
CDO OF CDO: A “CDO squared” is collateralized with pieces of existing cash flow or synthetic CDOs. Volume of $9.6 billion in 2007 has nearly matched full-year issuance of $9.9 billion in 2006 and more than double that of 2005.
STRUCTURES:
CASH FLOW CDO: These CDOs pay investors directly from the interest and principal payments to the underlying debt. These make up the bulk of CDOs.
SYNTHETIC CDO: A structured or corporate bond CDO created with contracts referencing the value of a bond, instead of the bond itself. Synthetic CDOs sell insurance against default of the referenced collateral with credit default swaps.
MARKET VALUE CDO: A security designed to rise or fall with the value of the underlying collateral.