Archive for June, 2007

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

    Jun 27, 2007

When hedge funds implode
By Axel Merk

The US trade deficit with the rest of the world leapfrogged in recent days. Aside from goods and services, the United States is now importing “consensus-based crisis management” from Japan.

Out of fear that a cleanup of bad loans would trigger widespread defaults, Japanese banks got themselves deeper and deeper into trouble by hushing up the problems. We are talking about the crisis at Bear Sterns’ subprime hedge fund. The crisis shows that major adjustments on how the market prices risks are overdue;


this may have negative implications for stocks, bonds, and commodities, as well as the US dollar.

Bear Sterns is a leading provider of services to hedge funds; it is also one of the largest originators of subprime-backed collateralized debt obligations. CDOs are what their name implies: a security backed by collateral. CDOs are created when mortgages with various risk profiles are grouped into different tranches or segments. Among others, Bear Sterns would create a CDO in a bundle according to a client’s specifications. Indeed, Bear Sterns would work with a rating agency, such as Moody’s, to obtain the desired rating (a practice likely to face more scrutiny as some allege that Moody’s no longer acts as an independent rating agency, but as a syndicator in the offering).

The explosive demand in this sector has attracted ever more creative structures. Investors should have grown concerned when dealmakers started suggesting that one can create a higher-grade security by grouping together a couple of lower-grade securities; it is rare that 1 + 1 = 3. As these instruments have grown more complex, the clients buying these instruments often do not have a full understanding of what they buy.

How do you make a best-seller better? You introduce leverage. Not only can leverage be introduced in the credit derivatives that define some of these securities, but brokers eager to attract hedge-fund business may also accept CDOs as collateral to lend money. The hedge fund now attracting so much attention is Bear Sterns’ High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, launched only 10 months ago. It shall be noted that Bear Sterns did not put much of its own money into the fund, but supplied many of the CDOs. A total of US$600 million in invested capital was boosted with borrowings of about $6 billion.

The collateral provided by the fund had the highest ratings by Moody’s. However, a high rating does not ensure that the CDOs are liquid, ie, that they can be sold off on short notice. This became painfully clear as bets of the fund were creating heavy losses and some lenders asked for more collateral for the loans extended. In the industry this is called a margin call. Bear Sterns told other lenders, including Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan and Citigroup, that the fund was unable to provide more collateral. On a side note, it is rather grotesque that Merrill, JPMorgan and Citigroup are among the larger investors in a fund managed by Bear Sterns. The company put little of its own money into the fund.

In the brokerage industry, when a margin call is not met (when the borrower cannot provide sufficient collateral), the broker may seize the collateral and liquidate open positions. While a forced sale of the collateral may be painful for the borrower, it protects the system as a whole. Such forced sales happen all the time in the futures market, where positions are “marked to market” every day to evaluate the profitability and risk of open positions.

But the CDO market is not a regulated futures market; there is no daily market price that would allow one to assess the value of the collateral. The primary methods used to value CDOs are called “mark to market” and “mark to model”. In the more conservative “mark to market” approach, independent parties are asked to value the securities; as the name implies, the “mark to model” approach is more aggressive and uses a computed, theoretical value.

But because these instruments are sold in privately negotiated transactions, rather than a regulated and liquid market, neither valuation method is suitable in case of a forced liquidation. In the case of Bear Sterns’ fund, Merrill Lynch sent bid sheets to numerous parties, soliciting prices for their holdings; as everyone knew that Merrill wanted to get rid of the securities at any price to cut its losses, it is fair to assume that the prices offered were significantly below the value assumed for the collateral.

As Merrill went public with its plan to auction off the collateral, others tried to rescue the fund. There was talk that Citigroup would inject $500 million and Bear Sterns might inject $1 billion. And the Blackstone Group was very interested in supplying much-needed capital. Blackstone’s offer required the brokers to abstain from further margin calls for 12 months. Such restrictions may be common in the private-equity world that Blackstone is active in, but was not acceptable to Merrill.

As the rescue plan fell through, Merrill stated that it would go ahead with its auction yet again. In the meantime, JPMorgan was front-running Merrill by trying to unload collateral it held for the Bear Sterns fund. When all was said and done, it wasn’t clear how much which broker was able to sell, but the sales were halted once again, and the parties seem to have agreed on an “orderly unwinding” of the positions.

This had the hallmark of the biggest financial crisis since the bailout of Long Term Capital Management. In 1998, the US Federal Reserve coordinated a bailout that led to the orderly unwinding of a fund that threatened the stability of the financial system. But this time is different: the instruments involved are so complex that journalists have had difficulty relaying the issues to the public, but the multiple calling and canceling of auctions by Merrill highlight the behind-the-scenes maneuvering to avoid fallout to the rest of the industry and beyond.

The risk to the financial system was not merely that some large brokerage firms may have been forced to write down a couple of hundred million dollars - they may still have to do that. But had the fire sale gone through, market values would have been available to the securities sold. This in turn would have forced other lenders to revalue the collateral they hold, and as the collateral is worth less, the brokers will lend less money. That would have triggered further margin calls, further forced liquidations.

When hedge funds implode, they tend to sell off more liquid assets first. At the end of the sale, the prices of the liquid assets are depressed, yet the fund may still be left holding illiquid securities. To illustrate this, take the example (this is not the Bear Sterns fund) of a hedge fund that may make bets on CDOs and, say, the price of oil. As such a fund needs to raise cash, it would close out the more liquid oil positions, causing a spike (or drop - depending on which way the unwinding works) in the price of oil. The resulting volatility in the markets would be most painful for leveraged investors in the oil market, although the crisis originated in the CDO market.

Too many leveraged investors have become complacent because of the low volatility enjoyed in recent years. Aside from the short-term volatility, the high leverage employed by many hedge funds would need to be reduced permanently. As speculators pare down their leverage, they sell off assets to raise cash.

The well-intended attempts to unwind the Bear Sterns fund in an orderly fashion are highly problematic. The fund’s problems have clearly shown that the credit extended to the industry is too large. The bankers involved commit similar mistakes to those of bankers in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s, where clearly bad loans were kept afloat with artificial means; those involved had the best intentions, but caused more than a decade of pain to Japanese banks, corporations and consumers.

It may well be that the value obtained in a fire sale is less than that obtained in an orderly liquidation. But the lesson to take home from this is that CDOs must not be used as collateral for 10:1 leverage. In our assessment, the unreasonable leverages employed by many hedge funds have contributed to a global liquidity glut that has driven up all asset classes, from stocks to bonds to commodities and other hard assets. As lenders have ignored risk, volatility reached abnormally low levels in 2006. Markets need risk to price assets properly; it is urgently necessary that volatility come back into the markets, so that lenders make more reasonable decisions.

The Bear Sterns debacle highlights that the industry has gone too far, and that it is high time that credit be reined in. So far, the first good that has come out of all this is that the planned initial public offering (IPO) of Everquest Financial seems to have been aborted: Bear Sterns was the underwriter in Everquest, a firm that specializes in buying CDOs from hedge funds.

Another hope is that traditionally more conservative investors, such as pension funds, will reduce their exposure to overly leveraged hedge funds. If such investors are told that they should not “rock the boat” with a rushed decision, they may be well served to take their losses now rather than potentially even greater losses later.

Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke is particularly proud that regulators have extensive experience on how to manage crises. The danger of superior crisis management is that you take the “danger” out of investing. Without risk, speculators have no restraint; in recent years, we have called this the “Greenspan put”, named after the reputation of former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan to allow bubbles to be created, and then bail out those who suffer from the bursting of the bubble. The Fed is shooting itself in the foot with such an attitude, as the Fed loses control of the money supply in a world where risk is underpriced.

When European Central Bank president Jean-Claude Trichet was recently asked whether the latest interest-rate hike in the euro-zone meant credit was now tight, he mused that higher interest rates mean little when sources of credit are abundant. His comments came before the recent selloff in bond prices. But as bond prices sold off in recent weeks, lower grade bonds fell not significantly more than government bonds. A healthy market requires a greater risk premium for junk bonds. The collapse of an overly speculative fund must be allowed, so that investors have an incentive to demand higher yields for riskier investments.

In summary, we expect volatility to pick up in all markets. As volatility picks up, speculators may sell assets to raise cash. Given the gains experienced in just about every asset class, there may be few places to hide. As bond prices may be under further pressure, the cost of borrowing goes up; this in turn may have implications for American consumers whose spending habits are interest-rate-sensitive because of their high levels of debt. This is where the circle to the trade deficit is closing.

The US dollar is dependent on inflows from abroad, as Americans import more than they export. If higher borrowing costs cause consumers to spend less, foreigners may redeploy more of their investments to other, more robust areas in the world. While Treasuries tend to be the first safe haven in times of increased volatility, the dollar no longer is the safe haven it used to be. In our view, a diversified approach to something as mundane as cash is something investors may want to evaluate. Gold is one such diversification; a basket of hard currencies is another.

Axel Merk is the portfolio manager of the Merk Hard Currency Fund.

(Copyright 2007 Axel Merk.)

 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/IF27Dj02.html 

EDHEC Style Rating: methodology

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

Increasingly demanding standards in terms of relevance and scientific rigor

The rating of mutual funds has been growing considerably not only in the United States but also in Europe. It provides an answer to a legitimate expectation on the part of investors and their consultants, who are concerned about comparing the performances and value-added of management offerings that are both increasing in number and becoming increasingly easy to switch in and out of, as a result of the arrival of “open” distribution architecture.

A corollary of the success of ratings and their growing influence on the collection of capital is that users are increasingly demanding with regard to the relevance and methodological rigor of the performance evaluation system implemented.

In point of fact, the classifications of the main rating services on the market no longer meet the principles of reliability demanded by both investors and management companies.

These demands are the following:

  • Genuine integration of risk in performance measurement
  • Performance persistence
  • Robustness and reliability of the results obtained
  • Transparency and legibility of the ratings

The EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating: methodology

The EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is put together from three criteria:

  • Risk-adjusted performance (or alpha)
  • Potential extreme loss (or VAR)
  • Performance persistence

For each of these dimensions of the rating, the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating relies on state-of-the-art conceptual and technical tools.

1. Measuring alphas

The risk-adjusted performance is measured in a two-step process.

The first step aims to select the style indices that represent the strategic allocation and therefore the risks taken over the rating period. This analysis is carried out in the form of a constrained multi-linear regression such as developed by William Sharpe.

Using this fund-specific style index selection and the related weights (customised benchmark), it is possible to calculate the fund’s excess performance while taking the risks to which it was really exposed into account. In order to do this, we use a multifactor index model which constitutes a robust and practical application of modern portfolio theory (Arbitrage Pricing Theory).

In order to limit the risks of collinearity between the indices, the fund universe was divided into 58 distinct categories using the EuroPerformance classification groupings.

Style Analysis Category
Equities Austria Equities Americas Equities Asia
Equities Belgium Equities Canada Equities Asia ex Japan
Equities Denmark Equities Latin America Equities Australia
Equities Emerging Europe Equities North America Equities China
Equities Euro Equities Hong-Kong
Equities Europe Equities Emerging Countries Equities India
Equities Europe ex UK Equities International Equities Japan
Equities Finland Equities Israel Equities Korea
Equities France Equities Morocco Equities Malaysia
Equities Germany Equities South Africa Equities Singapore
Equities Irland Equities Taiwan
Equities Italy Equities Thailand
Equities Netherlands Bonds British Pound
Equities Norway Bonds Euro Sectors Euro Zone
Equities Portugal Bonds Europe Sectors Europe
Equities Russia Bonds Europe High Yield Sectors World
Equities Scandinavia Bonds High yield Euro
Equities Spain Bonds International Balanced Euro zone
Equities Sweden Bonds International Hedged Balanced Europe
Equities Switzerland Bonds International High Yield Balanced International
Equities Turkey Bonds Swiss Franc
Equities United Kindom

2 Determining the potential extreme loss (VAR)

The concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) allows all the portfolio risks, which are spread between several asset classes, to be summed up in a single value. While a measure such as the variance characterises the average risk of the portfolio (mean dispersion in the return distribution), the Value-at-Risk refers to a value for the possible loss; in this sense, it is a measure of extreme risk.

The principle behind the VaR concept is therefore simple, but its practical implementation is more complex. The asset returns are assumed to be subject to common risk factors, which enables the portfolio’s return to be decomposed. By modelling the future evolution of these factors, it is possible to estimate the value of the portfolio at a fixed horizon and to deduce its VaR from there.

By estimating a Cornish Fisher-type semi-parametric VAR, the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating allow for the integration of the potential (to a 99% threshold) extreme loss for funds that present non-Gaussian return profiles, i.e. funds that do not respect a “normal distribution”, either because they invest in markets where the extreme losses are considerable, or because they use derivative instruments.

3 Performance persistence analysis

The performance persistence measure implemented by the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating relies on two indicators:

  • The calculation of the gain frequency, which measures the frequency of positive alpha over the whole period on a weekly basis, and which aims to identify the managers who “repeat” their performance
  • The Hurst exponent, which is a measure of the regularity of the outperformance, and which aims to evaluate the probability that, at the subscription stage, the outperformance will not be too different from that observed at the decision-making stage

4 Rating eligibility rules

The funds that are eligible for the Style Rating have the following elements:

  • at least 3 years of historical weekly return data
  • not more than 2 returns missing for the previous 156 weeks
  • an adjusted determination coefficient (R2) greater than 70% for the alpha calculation model exept for diversified funds and funds belonging to the international categories whose level is fixed to 60%.
  • a Value-At-Risk at the time the rating is calculated that is lower than the average VaR of its analysis category increased by 2 standard deviations

The funds belonging to the following categories are excluded:

  • Treasury Funds
  • Guaranteed Funds
  • Gold and Raw Material Sector Funds
  • ETFs and all funds practicing index or alterntive management

Finally, the Convertible Bonds category is not analysed because there is no style index for this category.

5. The rating presentation categories

The scores attributed by the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating are independent from any category and, as such, are perfectly comparable, whatever the type of fund rated.

Nonetheless, in order to simplify the presentation of the ratings, six categories have been defined to make them easier to read and to understand.

Presentation Category
European Equities
American Equities
International Equities
Euro Zone Bonds
International Bonds
Euro Diversified
International Diversified

6. Rules for attributing stars

Rating Attribution Table

Rating Diminishing Alpha Average Alpha Gain Frequency Hurst Exponent
>= 0 >= .5 >= .5
>= 0 >= .5
>= 0 < .5
>= - Average Mgt fees
50% + < - Average Mgt fees
50% - < - Average Mgt fees
VaR too high (V) Funds whose Value at Risk is greater than the average of the VaR in the analysis category + 2 standard deviations are identified and do not receive any star.
R2 too low (R2 ) In order to be graded, the coefficent of determination resulting from the style analysis must be higher than 70% exept for diversified funds and funds belonging to international categories whose level is fixed to 60%.

The EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is updated every month. The behaviours identified by the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating are stable and do not require the implementation of rating management rules that limit its variability.

7. Communication

The Style Rating is a measure of the quality of active management. The Style Rating criteria are demanding and fewer than 10% of the funds rated obtain the maximal rating of .

The and categories contain funds that do not outperform their objective on average. These funds were able to deliver positive performances over the period analysed while not exceeding the average performance produced by the indices that are representative of their strategy.

The category contains funds whose performance is very similar to that of the markets in which they are invested. Their outperformance nonetheless allows them to cover the average management fees in their category.

The and categories contain funds that outperform over the analysis period. This excess performance is the fruit of the manager’s decisions: active stock picking and/or market or style timing.

Among these funds that excel, some provide a significant gain frequency that characterises persistence of outperformance. These funds are distinguished by the maximal rating of .

Finally, the (Hurst exponent) category distinguishes funds that regularly outperform their benchmark. The ‘H’ is a decision support tool because it indicates that the investor has a better than average chance, at the subscription stage, of benefiting from good performance of the fund chosen.

The right to use the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is provided free of charge on condition that the source of the rating reproduced is cited. Details on the conditions and limitations of the use of the Style Rating are given on our website.

The Style Rating results are published on the 4th Friday of the month on this website: http://stylerating.com. The site provides details on the evolution of the rated funds and lists the funds excluded from the style rating. The technical documentation is also available on the website.

The cooperation between Europerformance and EDHEC

The EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating is an association between Europerformance and the Edhec Risk and Asset Management Research Centre.

The Edhec Risk and Asset Management Research Centre was set up in 2001. Its team of 28 research engineers, specialised associate researchers and professors work together on applied research programmes in the areas of asset allocation and performance measurement in the traditional and alternative universes.

Edhec is the scientific adviser to the EUROPERFORMANCE-EDHEC Style Rating.

Presentation of Style Rating

Technical documentation

 

alpha intensity

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

The Alpha League Table score: alpha intensity

The objective of the Alpha League Table is to allow asset management firms to be ranked according to their capacity to generate alpha frequently: alpha intensity.

Alpha intensity is the product of two indicators calculated using information from the EuroPerformance-EDHEC Style Rating:

  • The alpha frequency in the investment product range, which is determined according to the number of funds with strictly positive alpha (4 or 5 stars in the Style Rating) out of all of a given company’s rated funds;
  • The average alpha, which corresponds to the average percentage of alpha of the funds with strictly positive alpha (4 or 5 stars in the Style Rating).

    The Alpha League Table alpha intensity score is the product of the alpha frequency and average alpha figures.


    Example:

    If company X has an alpha frequency of 30%, i.e. 3 funds out of 10 have received a score of 4 or 5 stars, and an average alpha (>0) score of 4%, then its final rating will be: 4% x 0.30 = 1.2%.

    Similarly, if the company has a frequency figure of 50% and average alpha of 3%, its final score will be 3% x 0.50 = 1.5%.

  • http://www.edhec-risk.com/performance_and_style_analysis/alpha_league_table
  • EDHEC Alternative Indexes: May 2007 (Estimates)

    Saturday, June 30th, 2007

    EDHEC Alternative Indexes: May 2007 (Estimates)

    Conv. Arb. 1.21%

    Two-moments CAPM can be extended to a Four-Moment CAPM

    Saturday, June 30th, 2007

    Asset Allocation

    The Four-Moment capital asset pricing model: some basic results
    Authors: Jurcenzko and Maillet
    Date: 2002

    The authors show that the Two-moments CAPM can be extended to a Four-Moment CAPM where not only mean and variance are considered, but skewness and kurtosis. They derive a unified theory in a Four-Moment Capital Asset Pricing Model framework where variance, skewness and kurtosis receive a risk premium.

    The Two-moments CAPM is linked to return normality and to a quadratic utility function. This model is not empirically verified by finance studies. During the last 20 years, models going beyond mean and variance have been developed such as the Lower CAPM , Gini CAPM and VaR CAPM . To take account of the asymmetry effect of the return distribution, Rubinstein (1973) and Krauss, Litzenberger (1976) propose an extension of the classical Two-moments CAPM. The characteristic of their model is based on a systematic skewness premium. Jurcenzko and Maillet extend the work of previous researches with kurtosis and the first four co-moments.

    Like beta is related to variance, systematic skewness is related to skewness and sytematic kurtosis is related to kurtosis. The linked between variance, systematic skewness, systematic kurtosis and an asset expected return is the following:

            (1)

    where

    and Rm the market expected return, Sm the market skewness, Km the market kurtosis, α1 and α2 are respectively the premium required for skewness and kurtosis risk aversion. An asset with a negative contribution to portfolio skewness has a negative sytematic skewness, thus the second term in equation (1) will be positive and the E(R) will be positive. An asset with a positive contribution to portfolio kurtosis has a positive systematic kurtosis, thus the third term in equation (1) will be positive. Adding these two terms with the beta market premium gives the total asset expected return in a Four-Moment CAPM space. An asset with extreme risks (i.e. during equity/bond/currency market shocks , the asset negative returns is extemely lower with respect to thenormal case) should receive an additonal premium coming from equation (1) second and third terms.

    The Four-Moment CAPM has not been empirically tested except by Hwang and Satchell (1999). Further research needs to be done to test this model on assets with high devations from normality such emerging market and hedge fund indices.

    Footnotes

    {1} Nantel, , Price, Price (1982)

    {2} Okunev (1990)

    {3} Alexander, Baptista (2000)

    {4} For example a short put option or a merger arbitrage hedge fund index.

    {5} For example, an emerging market index or a low liquid asset.

    References

    Nantel T., Price B., Price K., Variance and lower partial moments measures of sytematic risk: some analytical and empirical results, Journal of Finance, 37, p.843-855, (1982)

    Okunev J., An alternative measure of mutual fund performance, Journal of business finance and accounting, 17, p.247-264, (1990)

    Alexander C., Baptista A., Economic implications of using a mean-VaR model for portfolio selection: a comparison with mean-variance selection, working paper, (2000)

    Hwang S., Satchell S., Modelling emerging markets risk premia using higher moments, International journal of finance and economics, 4, p.271-296, (1999)

    http://www.edhec-risk.com/site_edhecrisk/public/research_news/

    choice/RISKReview1063697659662713107

    Securitization Accounting: FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39

    Saturday, June 30th, 2007
     
     
     
    Securitization
     
    Understanding that securitization is a combination of process, regulation and technology, we have assembled the wealth and depth of experience – from the beginning of the securitization process to the end – to offer you a comprehensive business solution to your securitization challenges.

    Securitization Accounting: The Ins and Outs of FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39 and More Securitization Accounting: The Ins and Outs of FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39 and More…
    The seventh edition of this booklet deals with securitizations, mainly those employing term structures and traditional asset types.

    Learn more about this practice

    Contact us for more information

    Deloitte

    Securitization Accounting
    The Ins and Outs (And Some Do’s and Don’ts) of FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39 and More …

    The seventh edition of this booklet deals with securitizations, mainly those employing term structures and traditional asset types. We provide reference material for all the relevant, but separate, guidance issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) assembled in one place.

    Read our “Securitization Accounting” report in the attached PDF file below.

    Attachments
    Securitization Accounting (3493 KB)
    The Ins and Outs (And Some Do’s and Don’ts) of FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39 and More…

    Speaking of Securitization
    Accounting, tax, regulatory and other developments affecting transfers and servicing of financial assets

    Regulation AB requires, to the extent material, disclosure of original pool summary information and static pool information. The static pool information is to be disclosed on a periodic basis, either monthly or quarterly, and to include disclosures regarding delinquencies, cumulative losses and prepayments for the respective asset type. The rules call for information, to the extent material, for a minimum of five years or for such shorter period the sponsor has been either securitizing assets of the same asset type (in the case of seasoned sponsors) or making originations or purchases of assets of the same type (in the case of unseasoned sponsors).

    Given the many questions regarding what sponsors will disclose, we are providing the attached examples of:

    1. Original pool characteristics and static pool or performance data

    2. Disclaimers used on static pool Web sites

    3. Diagrams for transaction structures and flow of funds

    The attached survey covers disclosures from sponsors of Residential Mortgage, Commercial Mortgage, Auto Loan, Credit Card and Student Loan securitization transactions. The data were gathered from sponsors’ static pool Web sites or from preliminary prospectus supplements through January 22, 2006.

    Attachments
    SOS. Speaking of Securitization (610 KB)
    Reg AB: Static Pool Survey and Structural Diagrams of Flow of Funds

    Subprime: Point to Where It Hurts

    Saturday, June 30th, 2007

    Subprime: Point to Where It Hurts

    Steps to Modify Loans
    And Avert Foreclosures
    Has Investors Clashing

    By LINGLING WEI, RUTH SIMON and JAMES R. HAGERTY
    June 29, 2007; Page C1

    As defaults on home loans mount, mortgage companies are scrambling to work out deals to help as many borrowers as possible stay in their houses.

    On the surface, it seems an obvious tactic. Lenders usually end up losing money on foreclosed homes because of legal and other costs and the need to sell those properties fast, often at a knockdown price. Also, politicians are pressing mortgage companies to minimize the damages foreclosures cause to families and neighborhoods.

    Still, the effort to hold down foreclosures threatens to create clashes between mortgage companies and investors in securities backed by bundles of home loans, a $6 trillion market that has been shaken recently by losses on some of the riskier types of mortgage bonds. And because of the way these securities are sold, these efforts can pit groups of holders against each other.

    “It’s going to create a class warfare” among different types of investors, predicts Kyle Bass, managing partner of Hayman Capital Partners LP, a Dallas hedge fund.

    [Chart]

    Foreclosures are rising fast partly because lenders in recent years rushed to make no-money-down loans to people with weak credit records and didn’t always verify their income. At the same time, the decline in housing prices in much of the country makes it hard for borrowers who fall behind to sell their homes for enough money to pay off the loan.

    When borrowers can’t keep up, lenders typically consider whether it makes sense to offer a loan modification. Such workout deals, known as “mods,” often involve lowering the interest rate or stretching out the term. Lenders have used mods for years, but the practice is expected to proliferate as defaults rise.

    Sharon Greenberg, an analyst for Credit Suisse Group in New York, estimates that before this year modified loans typically accounted for less than 2% of all those outstanding. Within the next couple of years, she says, they may peak at several times that level.

    Investors holding mortgage-backed bonds are watching nervously because mods may not always be in their best interest. Some investors fear that loan servicers — the firms, often owned by lenders, that collect payments and deal with defaults — will make too many mods. Generally, investors favor mods that ease a normally reliable borrower through a rough patch, but not those that merely buy time for deadbeats.

    Investors doubt some homeowners merit a rescue plan. In some cases, says Kishore Yalamanchili, a fund manager with BlackRock Inc., New York, “by making these people current, you are pushing losses to another year or so.”

    Credit Suisse analysts recently examined loans that had been modified over the past few years by one nationwide lender and found that borrowers missed at least one monthly payment after a mod in nearly 40% of the cases. (That failure rate may have been skewed upward by victims of Hurricane Katrina who never returned to their homes.)

    If the borrower is unlikely to keep up with payments even after a mod, many investors would prefer that servicers pursue a foreclosure quickly, especially in regions where house prices are falling, reducing the value of the collateral.

    Servicers are required by their contracts to act in the interests of the investors and modify loans only when that can be expected to reduce losses. That puts servicers in the tricky position of trying to figure out which borrowers are basically sound and when it makes more sense to foreclose quickly.

    One complication is that different classes of investors have different interests, reflecting the complicated mechanics of mortgage securities. Issues of mortgage-backed securities are divided into slices with various ratings, depending on the level of risk. Holders of the highest-rated slices (those with the lowest risk) are first in line to collect payments of interest and principal flowing from the loans. Many such bond issues are structured so that there is initially more than enough cash flow available to cover obligations to all the investors, leaving a cushion to cover potential losses from loan defaults. If after three years or so the loans have performed well enough to meet certain performance measures, the cushion may be reduced.

    In that case, some of the excess cash available goes to holders of lower-rated securities and “residuals,” the highest-risk parts of the securities that are last in line for payments.

    If loan mods delay the onset of foreclosures, holders of the lower-rated securities and residuals are more likely to get those payments. But, holders of AAA and other high-rated securities may argue that the loan mods have artificially boosted the performance of the loans and that the holders of lower-rated securities and residuals are getting payments that should be preserved to protect owners of higher-rated paper against the risk of a resurgence of defaults later.

    Even where there are no clashes among investors, servicers face restrictions on how they modify loans.

    Moody’s Investors Service, a ratings provider, recently reviewed roughly 400 subprime mortgage-security transactions issued last year: 5% of those deals prohibit any kind of loan mod; among those that allow mods, about a third stipulate that no more than 5% of the loans backing the securities can be modified. Subprime loans are those to people with spotty credit histories.

    “Those restrictions may prevent servicers from doing the things they need to do,” says Larry Litton Jr., chief executive of Litton Loan Servicing, a unit of C-BASS LLC, New York. Mr. Litton says his firm hasn’t bumped up against any ceilings. Still, he favors eliminating restrictions in future issues of mortgage securities to give servicers more flexibility.

    Write to Lingling Wei at lingling.wei@dowjones.com, Ruth Simon at ruth.simon@wsj.com and James R. Hagerty at bob.hagerty@wsj.com

    CDOs: ABS and other sundry collateral

    Saturday, June 30th, 2007

     http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN2834578820070628

    CDOs: ABS and other sundry collateral

    Thu Jun 28, 2007 5:52PM EDT

    June 28 (Reuters) - Collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, are a rapidly growing class of securities created by bundling portions of other bonds into a new, more diversified structure that spreads the risk among investors around the world.

    Demand for CDOs in the past few years has fueled demand for other debt such as subprime mortgage asset-backed securities.

    While there are many kinds of debt used as collateral, the surge in subprime bonds as a percentage of total ABS has led to their domination in many CDOs. Investors watching the prolonged U.S. housing slump cause rising delinquencies and losses on the ABS expect CDO values and ratings will soon be affected.

    Losses at two Bear Stearns Cos. (BSC.N: Quote, Profile, Research) hedge funds after bad bets on subprime came to a head in June as bank creditors tried to extricate their investments in the fund. Most of the funds’ CDO assets put up for sale never found buyers at prices acceptable to the banks, fueling speculation that ABS CDOs would suffer widespread markdowns, sources said.

    High-grade CDOs buy the top, “AAA” rated portions, while so-called mezzanine CDOs are comprised of the riskier parts of underlying bonds structured to take the first losses, if any.

    U.S. CDO issuance surged in 2006 to $386 billion from about $201 billion in 2005, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. Managers have packaged $182 billion so far in 2007. (CDO volume in Europe last year was $141.2 billion. In Asia, it was $21.9 billion.) PRIMARY TYPES OF CDOs:

    STRUCTURED FINANCE CDO: Includes CDOs backed by asset-backed securities supported by residential mortgages (subprime, “Alt-A” and prime), student loans, manufactured housing loans, auto and credit card receivables.

    High-grade structured finance CDO issuance increased to $128.5 billion last year from $59 billion in 2005. Volume of mezzanine structured finance CDOs was $55.6 billion in 2006 and $30.7 billion in 2005. (Home-equity loans, consisting mostly of subprime mortgages, are the fastest-growing segment of ABS, rising to 26 percent this year from 14 percent in 2000.)

    Issuance of high-grade and mezzanine structured finance CDOs this year is on pace to exceed 2006’s record.

    C0RPORATE BOND CDO: A CDO backed by debt issued by a corporation, both junk and investment grade Investment-grade debt CDO issuance rose to $34.9 billion in 2006 from nearly $18 billion in 2005. High-yield bond CDO issuance that pioneered the CDO market in the late 1980s was $1.2 billion last year and $1.6 billion in 2005. Volume is just above $1 billion for both categories this year.

    COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS, or CLOs: A type of CDO packaged with slices of high-yield bank loans. Issuance rose to $106 billion in 2006 from $59.7 billion in 2005. More than $53 billion has been sold since January this year.

    OTHER TYPES OF CDOs:

    COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BOND CDO: A CDO backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS. Volume of $28.3 billion last year was more than double that of 2005. Issuance this year has topped $12.6 billion

    EMERGING MARKET BOND CDO: A CDO backed by emerging market debt. Sales of $881 million in 2006 compare with $1.6 billion in 2005.

    CDO OF CDO: A “CDO squared” is collateralized with pieces of existing cash flow or synthetic CDOs. Volume of $9.6 billion in 2007 has nearly matched full-year issuance of $9.9 billion in 2006 and more than double that of 2005.

    STRUCTURES:

    CASH FLOW CDO: These CDOs pay investors directly from the interest and principal payments to the underlying debt. These make up the bulk of CDOs.

    SYNTHETIC CDO: A structured or corporate bond CDO created with contracts referencing the value of a bond, instead of the bond itself. Synthetic CDOs sell insurance against default of the referenced collateral with credit default swaps.

    MARKET VALUE CDO: A security designed to rise or fall with the value of the underlying collateral.